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Introduction
Mandatory comply or explain is one of the principal ideas underlying the implementation of corporate governance codes in Europe.
i It combines flexibility and voluntariness of compliance with code recommendations with an obligation to explain any deviation from code recommendations. In Germany, the legislature clearly aimed to instil investor trust in German corporate governance rules, through disclosure when providing for comply or explain in the German Stock Corporation Act 2002 (Leyens 2016 ).
Even so, as the EU Commission pointed out in a 2011 Green Paper entitled 'The EU corporate governance framework', despite the success of the comply or explain principle, improvement and greater clarity are needed when it comes to the explanations given by companies when they deviate.
ii This observation was reinforced by a 2014 Commission
Recommendation on the quality of corporate governance reporting.
iii At the same time, this need for greater specificity has been accompanied by calls for the development of a 'culture of departure from code recommendations', in order to enhance flexibility and ensure that compliance is tailored to each company's individual needs. These two demands raise the important question of what is driving code compliance and the underlying legitimacy of corporate governance codes. Who are companies' explanations addressed to: potential shareholders, investors or stakeholders in general? Turning our attention to which rules motivate corporate behaviour without affecting corporations' material interests could open the door to extending the analysis beyond shareholder wealth maximization to include stakeholder interests.
Comply or Explain as the basis of corporate governance codes (a) Diffusion and nature of corporate governance codes
The idea of corporate governance codes, as it is understood today, did not take hold before the early 1990s. That was when the Cadbury Committee, named for its chairperson Sir
Adrian Cadbury, came up with recommendations on corporate governance best practices in the UK (Cadbury Report 1992) . The Cadbury Report not only began the development of good conduct codes in the UK, notably the Combined Code 1998 Code , 2003 Code , 2006 Code and 2008 successor the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 (Mallin 2016 , it also paved the way for the emergence of corporate governance codes across Europe.
Under the influence of the Cadbury Code, other EU Member States developed similar corporate governance codes (Clarke 2007, 175-79; Wymeersch 2008, 66-72; Zattoni and Cuomo 2008, 6- The Cadbury Code can also be seen as the starting point of the comply or explain principle (Cadbury Report 1992, 1.3). As corporate governance codes were developed in continental European states, adoption of the comply or explain principle spread, despite considerable structural differences between these countries, for example with regard to ownership structures, institutional shareholdings and legal framework.
(b) Compliance (i) Extent
Even when looking only at a small sample of Member States, the different declared levels of compliance across countries are notable (Seidl 2007, 3-4) . A rough overview indicates a compliance rate of above 90 per cent for the largest listed companies in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Germany (Wymeersch 2008, 95-8; RiskMetrics Group 2009, 88-97 95.2 per cent) with the recommendations of the German Code (Beyenbach et al, 2016, 1, 4) .
(ii) Compliance -Enforcement by Markets
A. Concept of the German Corporate Governance Code
In light of these fairly high compliance rates, the question quite naturally arises as to the reasons and pressures that lead to compliance with the code. The Management and Executive Boards of the listed company declare every year that they have complied and will comply with the recommendations of the "Governmental Commission German Corporate Governance Code" […] or declare which recommendations they have not or will not comply with. This declaration must be made available to the shareholders on a permanent basis.
By looking at this indirect method of enforcement, one can see the more general implementation mechanism that underlies the German Code. In trying to instil confidence, amongst both present and future shareholders, in the corporate governance of German listed companies, the German Code focuses on international global capital markets and investors (Wackerbarth 2005, 696) . Since the beginning of the corporate governance debate in the mid90s, and becoming even more apparent with the takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone, the comply or explain regime under the code was designed to make the corporate governance standards and practices of German corporations clear to investors. Assuming causation between corporate governance and market success, when the German Code came into force, the chairman of the German Government Commission on the Code, Gerhard Cromme, stated that capital markets would punish companies that did not follow the code (Cromme 2001 ).
This assumption, and the incentive mechanism that resulted, seems to have been confirmed by subsequent compliance with the code by a large majority of German companies.
B. Contract-based corporate theory as a parallel -markets and underlying decision-making process
In light of this market-oriented regulatory approach, at first instance a parallel to the contract-based theory in US corporate law doctrine does not seem to be too farfetched. In both cases an important focus is on the alignment of management and shareholder interests. Under a contractarian approach, financial instruments such as stocks and bonds are looked at as a contractual solution to the principal-agent conflict -that is, the divergence of management and shareholder interests. This results in the notion of the 'nexus of contracts' model of the corporation, which highlights the primacy of contract over state legislation (Jensen and Meckling 1976 techniques, the pressure of the capital market is supposed to provide for optimal corporate governance rules. There is, however, one remaining fundamental difference that results from the implementation of the code using the comply or explain principle (MacNeil and Li 2006, 493) . It is that directors have the greatest influence on compliance or noncompliance with the code, whereas the question of what corporate law to pick falls to the founding shareholders at the time of incorporation. Despite this difference, the link between private law-making of socalled soft law and legislated law is so small, that it seems appropriate to characterize the former as a hybrid regulatory instrument, even though the self-regulatory component prevails (Weiss 2011, 131) . This becomes apparent from the pure opt-in character of the code, as opposed to the opt-out regime of corporate law rules from the contractarian perspective. The code provides for a standard that need not be met for a corporation to do business, whereas corporate law provides for legal rules as a necessary infrastructure for market participants to form a corporation as a stand-alone market player (Bachmann 2013, 79) .
The hybridity of corporate governance codes also shows itself in the way these codes can be changed and revised without necessary legislative interference. The adoption of the comply or explain principle demonstrates that the legislature is aware of a need for rules, without having a clear notion of what these rules should look like, so that the field of corporate governance develops into an experimental site for regulatory ideas (Windbichler 2009, 29) . Despite the resulting advantage of greater flexibility and adaptability, there is no denying the fact that at the same time, this may bring about an opaque political decisionmaking process that may be captured by interest groups (MacNeil and Li 2006, 493) .
C. Empirical evidence
Despite these rather fundamental differences between the nexus of contracts concept and the comply or explain principle, the German Code is also focused on international global capital markets and investors, trying to motivate potential shareholders to invest in German listed companies (Wackerbarth 2005, 696) . Assuming a causality exists between corporate governance and market success, one would expect empirical evidence of a positive correlation between governance measures, disclosure and code compliance on the one hand, and market return on the other. This assumption indeed underlies the legislature's motivation, v as seen in the initial statement of Chairman Cromme that whoever did not follow the code would be punished by the capital market, and it is still found frequently in current German corporate law scholarship (Habersack 2012, E27) . At the same time, scepticism as to capital market pressure towards compliance seems to be increasing in more recent German literature (Bachmann 2013, 81; Böcking et al. 2012, 618; Spindler 2011 Spindler , 1009 Weiss 2011, 115-6) .
In summary, the overall outcome of empirical research on the relationship between disclosure and code compliance and performance or market return is unclear. The evidence is mixed, indicating a positive effect in general or in individual countries such as Switzerland or Spain (Del Brio et al. 2006; Beiner et al. 2006; Fernández-Rodrígez at al. 2004 ), or no effect of code compliance (Alves and Mendes 2006; de Jong et al. 2005 ). One study of FTSE 100
companies not complying with the Combined Code in the UK even indicated a negative effect of compliance on financial performance -in other words, investors seem willing to tolerate noncompliance when financial performance is sufficiently good (MacNeil and Li 2006) .
Therefore, overall evidence for a strict relationship between code compliance and performance does not seem conclusive, even though individual measures may have a positive effect (Wymeersch 2008, 90) .
In empirical studies on the actual link between compliance with the German Code and market success, the inconsistent picture described above repeats itself. vi Looking at the methodological problems raised in these studies, this seems hardly surprising. For example, it is impossible to exclude overarching factors that are related to governance and thus have an influence on the correlation between code compliance and performance, so that the problem of reverse causation cannot be eliminated (Mura 2007; Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Lehn et al. 2007 ). In addition, looking at the number of recommendations entering into governance aggregates such as ratings or codices whose correlation with performance is examined makes the difficulty even more evident (Prigge 2012, 6) . Furthermore, specific company characteristics such as firm size will have an influence on this correlation (Fernández-Rodrígez et al. 2004) . Looking at the studies in more detail, one additionally finds that different performance measures are used, data at times dates back to 2005, and only compliance with recommendations, but not with suggestions (which are also important components of the German Code), is included, so that statements on the correlation between compliance and performance are necessarily incomplete (Graf and Stiglbauer 2007; Stiglbauer 2010, 62-3) .
(iii) Compliance based on economic, social, and normative motivations
In light of this ambiguous evidence of the link between compliance and performance, it stands to reason to look for motivations for compliance other than pure efficiency ( pointing at a substitutive effect of code compliance vis-à-vis high agency costs and limited external ownership control ). Based on these findings, later studies suggest the need for a more differentiated approach and a closer analysis of the explanations of noncompliance, implying that well-reasoned noncompliance will lead to better corporate governance in specific cases (Böcking et al. 2012, 619-25) . According to another closer analysis of the explanations of noncompliance, there seems to be consistent empirical evidence that comparably high noncompliance rates among companies listed in the General Standard, as opposed to DAX-listed companies, are not mainly based on the firm-specific situation of those companies, but instead on their disagreement with the general regulatory purposes and suitability of the respective recommendations. Thus the companies listed in the General Standard appear to feel under less pressure to comply, and the Code is therefore less effective in this segment (Von Werder et al. 2011, 502) . Going beyond a market-based analysis, a 2012 survey of chairmen of the management and supervisory boards of all companies listed in Frankfurt, including 25 DAX-listed, 32 MDAX-listed, 9 TecDAX-listed, 25 SDAX-listed companies, and 38 more companies listed on the Prime Standard and another 36 listed on the General Standard, shows that at that time, 41 per cent of the companies did feel pressure to comply. That pressure, however, seemingly did not so much emanate from equity holders, who were perceived as only the third most important driver of compliance.
More important were proxy advisors, who ranked first, and the media, who were second (Von Werder and Bartz 2012, 872) .
Compliance patterns between the market and the law
In light of the increasing criticism of the German Code, the survey of 2012 just mentioned raises the question of how the executives interviewed in the survey assessed the usefulness, the relevance and the effectiveness of all the recommendations and suggestions (Von Werder and Bartz 2012, 873-7) . If 50 per cent, or more, of interviewees rated a recommendation as negative, the recommendation is considered relatively or mainly unuseful, respectively (Von Werder and Bartz 2012, 873-874 This is even more surprising, because the support for stock option pay in the German
Code has been in line with the general development of incentive pay for executives in general.
It is true that stock options are much less common among German companies than they are among US companies. Compared with the situation before 1998, when an amendment to the German Stock Corporation Act made stock option pay more attractive, and thanks to subsequent changes in the tax regime, stock option pay in Germany has increased significantly in the first decade of this century and been used as an important incentive for management (Cheffins 2001, 511-3; Haar 2012, 491) . This growing use of stock option pay has however been limited to the compensation of the management board, even though the German Code has also explicitly provided for performance-based compensation for supervisory board members.
This raises the question of the reasons for noncompliance, in light of the code, the presumed capital market performance pointing in the other direction, and the closely related shareholder interest in wealth maximization. Looking at the remarkable changes in corporate governance practice in Germany and its strengthened capital market orientation, it does not seem plausible any more to simply attribute this low compliance rate to cultural factors and labour opposition. ix Instead, there may be incentives that are directed not so much towards the outside capital market, but towards the inside negotiation process of the company. These incentives would, however, support the opposite argument, relying on potential board control and managerial power over compensation agreements and norms of reciprocity and similarity that constrain board members from scrutinizing executive compensation awards, and therefore argue for the use of stock option pay in the compensation agreements for supervisory board members (Kahan 2001 (Kahan , 1892 ).
x Therefore there have to be reasons even stronger than these incentives working in the opposite direction, against such use. One oft-cited argument against stock option pay is the 'outrage constraint'. This ultimately relies on reputational constraints on directors that may prevent them from awarding overly generous compensation. Especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis, stock option pay has become increasingly unpopular among the general public in Germany.
(i) Legal framework under the German Stock Corporation Act
It seems questionable, however, whether such reputational constraints would actually entirely eliminate the above-mentioned incentives to comply, and thus whether there may not be separate reasons for the high rate of noncompliance. Looking at the regulation of executive pay in the German Stock Corporation Act, one finds further and stronger reasons for noncompliance. It is true that incentive pay is explicitly provided for, but only with regard to members of the management board, in ss 87(1) and (2) and ss 192 and 193(2)(4). As far as supervisory board members are concerned, s 113(3) of the German Stock Corporation Act simply states that the profit share is calculated according to the balance sheet profit, thus assuming the legality of variable pay for supervisory board members (Spindler 2015a, note 39 
(iii)The interaction between compliance and the law in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis
This amendment was not only motivated by concern about a 'fairness gap' between directors' pay and that of rank and file employees (Seibert 2010) . In fact, the legal debate was kicked off by the question of whether short-term incentive-based compensation had actually exacerbated the financial crisis. As a result, this debate subsequently centred on how to eliminate share options which incentivised managers to undertake excessive risk in pursuit of short-lived increases in share prices, rather than sustainable growth of the company's business (Seibert 2010, 959) . The key provision of the rules on executive pay in s 87(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act prescribes that 'the compensation structure has to be aimed toward a sustainable development of the company's business ... If companies prefer not to comply, by not including severance pay caps in their compensation agreements, in order to be more flexible in their choice of how to structure their incentive pay, they have to consider whether such noncompliance will be accepted by shareholders and the public (MacNeil and Li 2006; Seidl 2007) . Therefore the capital market pressure to comply, initially perceived as the most important enforcement mechanism of the Code, is replaced by the pressure of how to explain noncompliance. Since companies do not know whether the relevant parties will accept their underlying motivation for noncompliance, it is reasonable that they look to similarly situated peers, thus trying to increase the legitimacy of their noncompliance (Haunschild and Miner 1997; Lieberman and Asabe 2006; Seidl 2007) . As a consequence, parallelism between explanations and noncompliance can be expected among similar companies. (Brunsson 2000) .
(ii) Empirical evidence
On the empirical side, this pattern of compliance has been put to the test using data for an 'outrage constraint' upon executive pay without performance (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker 2002, 786-7) . In addition, there have been spectacular cases of abuse of fixed-term employment contracts and their termination, resulting in the payment of enormously high amounts of severance pay to executives, causing a great public outcry. This motivation also seems to follow from the change of compliance patterns observable after a notable change to this provision in 2012, when the commission further specified that no severance pay may be paid in case of termination 'for a serious cause for which the management board member is responsible'. Subsequently this recommendation has been considered as generally accepted, and has been complied with by 92 per cent of the DAX-listed companies in 2014 (von Werder and Bartz 2014, 909) . Thus the pressure to provide for severance pay caps has apparently increased, resulting from an outrage constraint upon what top executives can pay themselves without eliciting public or media pressure (Bebchuk et al. 2002, 786-7) . With reputational concerns explaining companies' compliance patterns, yet another ingredient enters the interaction between compliance, the law and economics: social motivations, which open the door for the consideration of corporate stakeholders other than shareholders.
(c) Low compliance with problematic recommendations
Social motivations and reputational concerns are also involved in another field, touched upon by a recommendation whose efficiency is rated rather low by the executives interviewed in the survey cited above (von Werder and Bartz 2012, 876) . That is paragraph 2, sent. 2 of Recommendation 5.4.1 , which provides that:
The Supervisory Board shall specify concrete objectives regarding its composition which, whilst considering the specifics of the enterprise, take into account the international activities of the enterprise, potential conflicts of interest, the number of independent Supervisory Board members within the meaning of number 5.4.2, an age limit to be specified for the members of the Supervisory Board and diversity. These concrete objectives shall, in particular, stipulate an appropriate degree of female representation. (German Code of May 15, 2012) The part of this provision where compliance rate is strikingly low is the recommendation of an age limit for supervisory board members. In 2013 In , 2014 was complied with by a relatively low 85.2 per cent, 88 per cent, and 82.6 per cent of DAXlisted companies respectively (von Werder and Bartz 2013, 889; von Werder and Bartz 2014, 910; Turkali 2015, 1362) . In addition to the evidence from the abovementioned survey, there is empirical evidence indicating that capital markets value deviation from this recommendation positively, taking the age of a supervisory board member as an indicator of his or her experience and knowledge (Bassen et al. 2009, 394) . By contrast, the age limit recommendation is based on the assumption that performance decreases with age.
This approach is also reflected by the keyword 'professionalization', which has been the name of the game for the supervisory board for quite a while now, and as such has also been called and 2015 overall) with this age limit recommendation seems surprising. In light of the ambiguous pressure in both directions, such as the capital market pointing against an age limit on the one hand, and social values associated with youth and perceived higher performance supported by wider society on the other, there may be internal stakeholders additionally pushing in the direction of compliance.
First, the supervisory board members themselves may be interested to leave the company through a well-ordered procedure, regulated by a clear age limit, instead of making their departure dependent on an observable decline in performance. In addition to other plausible reasons for an age limit such as the prevention of 'blindness' to organizational deficiencies xvi , by setting an age limit, the supervisory board vouches for the effectiveness of the insider reward system (Langevoort 2001, 808) . Though it is true that insiders no longer move from the management board to the supervisory board as often as they used to, in light of the cooling off period of two years adopted by amendment of the German Stock Corporation Act in 2009, xvii an age limit will still enhance incentives. Along these lines, paragraph 2 of Recommendation 5.4.1 of the German Code has recently been further amended, to the effect that 'a regular limit of length of membership [shall] be specified'. Thus the law follows the Code when it comes to strengthening the sustainable legitimacy of its recommendations.
Conclusion -The case for compliance with the Code
The key drivers of the interplay between corporate behaviour and legal evolution have become apparent in the preceding analysis in different ways, and can be summarized by way of a conclusion.
In the case of the incentive pay for supervisory board members recommended under s 5.4.6 of the German Code, the determinant of compliance was the evolution of the pertinent case law. Later on, legally binding regulation has proved to be the guideline for the Code.
Ultimately, this may result in reputational concerns relating to the publicity that results from violating regulatory requirements (May 2004 ).
Analysis of the compliance patterns relating to severance pay caps indicated another consequence flowing from firms' attempts to avoid reputational harm, which applied especially to the highly visible DAX-listed companies. Namely, there was a striking uniformity in the explanations for noncompliance. At the bottom of this peer pressure to comply with noncompliance lies the reputation at stake in this provision, that also reflects the general public interest, giving effect to an outrage constraint.
Since the debate on age limits for supervisory board members and the professionalization of the board is very up to date and at the same time controversial, companies could establish themselves at the forefront of the current political discussion and its opinion leaders. But judging from compliance rates, this rationale does not seem to push strongly enough towards compliance as to outweigh other factors that may enter into companies' decision-making, such as the performance-enhancing experience contributed by older board members. This complex mixture of effects hints at the different economic, social and cognitive implications that may play out in favour of compliance, but not as distinctly as for reputational concerns. These alternative motivations for compliance (and thus bases for the legitimacy of the Code) may result from insider and group interests. They overlap with the publicly endorsed discourse on high performance capacity of young people and declining performance levels with older age, calling into question a purely capital market-based shareholder value model of code compliance. At times, this may arguably require a legislative nudge and designate the responsibility of the legislature and the limits of the legitimacy of the Code (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) .
